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Intellectual Property Experimentalism By Way Of Competition Law 
BY TIM W U1
Competition law and Intellectual Property have divergent intellectual cultures–the former more pragmatic and experimentalist; the latter in!uenced by natural law and vested rights. "e US Supreme Court decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis is an intellectual victory for the former approach, one 
that suggests that antitrust law can and should be used to introduce greater scrutiny of the speci#c consequences 
of intellectual property grants. 
One day at the Athenaeum club in London, an unnamed attorney said something along these lines:
“We know that the laws only penalize agreements that restrain competition. Given the existence of a valid 
patent, the market belongs to the drug manufacturer, and there is, therefore, no possibility of restraining com-
petition.”
“You’re saying generic drug makers and pharmaceutical companies aren’t competitors,” said someone, with 
an air of disbelief.
“Of course not,” said the attorney, “because as an owner of a patent, they have been given the market, so 
there is no competition.”
“I can’t sit here and listen to this,” said someone else.
"e exchange of words above, one of many heated 
exchanges during that day, may seem like nothing 
more than a typical clash between those who happen 
to take di$erent views of a case. But disagreements 
can sometimes reveal something deeper, and what 
comes across here is a fundamental intellectual divide 
between practitioners in the intellectual property and 
competition law #elds. While sometimes said to share 
“a common purpose of promoting innovation and 
consumer welfare,”2 those with any experience in the 
two #elds know how di$erent the thinking in each can 
be. "e competition law is more pragmatic in orienta-
tion, and, borrowing from the norms of economists, 
strongly interested in the consequences of the law’s 
operation. Meanwhile the intellectual property laws 
retain a dominant culture closer to a natural law rights 
tradition, taking the primary duty of law as the creation and protection of vested rights, with less regard for 
the speci#c e$ects of rights granted. 
THE COMPETITION LAW IS MORE 
PRAGMATIC IN ORIENTATION, AND, 
BORROWING FROM THE NORMS OF 
ECONOMISTS, STRONGLY INTERESTED 
IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
LAW’S OPERATION. MEANWHILE 
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS 
RETAIN A DOMINANT CULTURE 
CLOSER TO A NATURAL LAW RIGHTS 
TRADITION, TAKING THE PRIMARY 
DUTY OF LAW AS THE CREATION AND 
PROTECTION OF VESTED RIGHTS, 
WITH LESS REGARD FOR THE SPECIFIC 
EFFECTS OF RIGHTS GRANTED. 
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While I’m hardly the !rst to write about the distinctive intellectual traditions of the two regimes,3 in 
this paper I want to try to take a new look at the intellectual divide, and in particular, how it yields di"erent 
approaches to a key issue, namely, how the law reacts to changing conditions and unintended consequences. 
I am not neutral party in this debate. I believe that the IP laws in general, and the patent laws in particular, 
need to be better attuned to their actual e"ects on commerce. Stated di"erently, I think we need a more experi-
mentalist intellectual property regime, that is, one that views the laws as an ongoing project in constant need of 
improvement.4  As a practical matter, however, such regime change seems unlikely to emerge organically. One 
means for introducing a more error-sensitive intellectual property system is increased use of the competition 
laws as an oversight regime.
#at’s a task that competition enforcers have already been taking seriously, and the Supreme Court’s 2013 
decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis can be read (perhaps generously) as a blessing of such e"orts. 
#e decision e"ectively approved more than a decade of e"orts by the Federal Trade Commission to stop 
“pay-for-delay” patent settlements that it considered anticompetitive. At a more general level, it approved of 
an ongoing examination of the actual consequences of patents using the antitrust laws, and as such the details 
of the decision are less important than its approach. Of course, implicit in the grant of a patent is accepting 
anticompetitive consequences, but in Actavis the Court viewed that fact merely as another factor for antitrust 
analysis. In other words, one job of the competition laws is improving the patent system and perhaps intel-
lectual property more generally.
I.  EXPERIMENTALISM
Experimentalism is not a word that attorneys use very often. At its most general, the idea of legal experimental-
ism is to apply the scienti!c method of hypothesis, experiment, and observation of consequence to challenging 
legal and policy problems. It is, as such, closely related to a “pragmatist” legal philosophy.5
John Dewey is usually credited with laying a philosophical foundation for policy experimentalism in his 
writings in the 1910s and 1920s. Dewey, whose background was in education, believed that a successful de-
mocracy needed the capacity to learn and improve itself. #e key to learning, he believed, was the processing 
of experiences, or in his words the “reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning 
of experience and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.”6
As relevant to the legal system, Dewey thought policy and “proposals for social action” should be subject 
to the experimental method. Policy-making, he said, should be a constant process of learning from experience, 
rather than relying on rigid or foundational truths. “Policies,” Dewey argued, should be “experimental in the 
sense that they will be entertained subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences they 
entail when acted upon, and subject to ready and %exible revision in the light of observed consequences.”7 
As understood here we can describe legal experimentalism as comprising three main principles. First, for 
the experimentalist, laws are simply instruments meant to achieve some end and useful only to the extent they 
do so. A law has no intrinsic value, and its existence should not necessarily count in favor of its retention.
Second, every law should be thought of as an ongoing experiment. #at is to say, every enactment, regu-
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lation or judicial opinion must be seen as that moment’s best guess as to what a rule should be, in light of 
imperfect information and human fallibility. Borrowing Dewey’s language, policies should be thought of as a 
“working hypothesis, not as programs to be rigidly adhered to and executed.”8  Given the imperfect nature of 
law-making, policy should be subject to revision when faced with new information or changed conditions. !e 
law must also be able to learn and improve itself based on observation of consequences, intended or otherwise.
!ird, in service of the "rst two principles, the relevant institutions should be designed to learn and im-
prove the law through an experimental process. !ere are, actually, many ways this could be achieved. 9 But 
to actually perform something that resembles an experiment, its most important structure is some tolerance 
for legal diversity, coupled with a centralized mechanism for evaluating the results of di#erent approaches to 
the same problem.
II.  COMPETITION LAW
Over the last few decades, legal regimes that are experimentalist by design have emerged in discrete areas of 
regulation, such as mine safety or in the use of drug courts. As Professors Charles Sabel10 and Bill Simon put 
it, these are institutions that achieve a “decentralization of operative control with central coordination of the 
evaluation of results.”11  But it is also possible for legal experimentalism to arise organically, particularly when 
scattered lawmakers confront similar problems repeatedly. Arguably, for example, a form of serial experimentalism 
has been going on for centuries within the framework in the common law tradition, where diverse judges work 
through cases, continually reassessing old precedent and occasionally discarding rules that no longer work.12 
While competition law isn’t formally experimental-
ist, I suggest that the competition and antitrust laws 
tend toward such informal experimentalism. It is, "rst, 
evident that the competition law has long been consid-
ered an instrument for achieving goals, not recognizing 
abstract rights. !e law’s goals are general to a fault: 
once upon a time in the United States, “to eliminate 
the evil of bigness;”13 in more recent decades, the less 
colorful goal of “encourage[ing] competitive markets 
to promote consumer welfare.”14 Even if the goals of 
the law have evolved, the idea that the law is only really 
understood as valuable to the degree it promotes those 
goals has not.15 None of this is to say that antitrust 
attorneys never get "xed in their views, but that isn’t 
usually seen as an attractive trait.
Structurally, over the last several decades, the geographic spread of competition laws has created a natural 
experimentalist structure. !e exact same legal problem is often faced by the European authorities, the two 
American agencies (Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission), and  hundreds other national 
competition authorities, American states, and individual American judges in private lawsuits. Furthermore, within 
the large agencies, individual sta# attorneys often have a surprising discretion to begin informal investigations.
ARGUABLY, FOR EXAMPLE, A FORM OF 
SERIAL EXPERIMENTALISM HAS BEEN 
GOING ON FOR CENTURIES WITHIN THE 
FRAMEWORK IN THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION, WHERE DIVERSE JUDGES 
WORK THROUGH CASES, CONTINUALLY 
REASSESSING OLD PRECEDENT AND 
OCCASIONALLY DISCARDING RULES 
THAT NO LONGER WORK.12 
WHILE COMPETITION LAW ISN’T 
FORMALLY EXPERIMENTALIST, I 
SUGGEST THAT THE COMPETITION 
AND ANTITRUST LAWS TEND TOWARD 
SUCH INFORMAL EXPERIMENTALISM.
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!at experimentalist structure has been preserved, because, despite the obvious potential for international 
con"ict, there is no serious movement toward a single, uniform competition law, and there is no global competi-
tion law treaty. As Hugh Hollman, Bill Kovacic and Andrew Robertson put it, “complete uniformity is probably 
unattainable and undesirable” for it would impede experimentation.16 As we shall see, that’s an attitude sharply 
at odds with the position taken in the intellectual property community.
Finally, for more than a century in the United 
States, and for decades in Europe and the rest of the 
world, the law has undergone ongoing tinkering and 
serial experimentation by legislatures, agencies, and 
courts. !at is true both within regimes and across 
them. Consider, for example, the speci#c history of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which has gone through 
various peaks and valleys not unlike a long-running 
cardiogram. Based on then-current opinion, the law 
has gone from being close to a no-fault deconcentra-
tion rule17 to something very close to dead (during 
the second Bush administration).18 Or consider that 
there have been six versions of the American merger 
guidelines since 1968. 
Europe has, if anything, seen greater variation. Consider, for example, the initial years of the European 
Commission Merger Regulation focused on the formal distinction between “cooperative” and “concentrative” 
joint ventures.19 European merger control has quickly evolved both in application and legislatively. !roughout 
the ‘90s the European Commission entertained novel antitrust theories and remedies,20 and by 2004, just 15 
years after the regulations were enacted, the ECMR saw substantial reform that, among other things, enabled 
the commission to prohibit mergers that “signi#cantly impede e$ective competition” even if the merger would 
not confer dominance, which previously had been the sole standard.21
To be sure, this history of tinkering is not quite the formal, parallel experimentation that Sabel discusses. 
A critic might point out that Europeans don’t necessarily feel bound to learn from American failures, and vice 
versa. But what creates an experimentalist culture, as opposed to just legal diversity is a sense of continuing 
trying to learn from what has succeeded and what has failed. !is may be due to the in"uence of economists 
than any other reason, and their fondness for the “natural experiment.”22  Of course, the success or failure of 
any law is hard and maybe impossible to measure accurately, which makes this a challenging proposition. Given 
the lack of controls and the di%culty of untangling cause and e$ect, it is di%cult to know whether a given 
merger policy was more or less successful, or whether a major investigation was just a waste of resources or a 
critical turning point for an industry. But nonetheless there is a spirit of learning that is manifested in e$orts 
to learn from failures, or imitate investigations seen as successful.
!e global competition system also lacks any formal system for a centralized assessment of di$erent ap-
proaches. However there are informal mechanisms for doing so, including the International Competition 
Network, the OECD working group and other less formal groups that spend their time assessing best practices 
and, informally, comparing results.
THE GLOBAL COMPETITION SYSTEM 
ALSO LACKS ANY FORMAL SYSTEM 
FOR A CENTRALIZED ASSESSMENT OF 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES. HOWEVER 
THERE ARE INFORMAL MECHANISMS 
FOR DOING SO, INCLUDING THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
NETWORK, THE OECD WORKING 
GROUP AND OTHER LESS FORMAL 
GROUPS THAT SPEND THEIR TIME 
ASSESSING BEST PRACTICES AND, 
INFORMALLY, COMPARING RESULTS.
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 III.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
To say that the copyright, trademark and patent laws do not have an experimentalist spirit might be something 
of an understatement. Rather, to describe the laws as an ongoing experiment might easily risk o!ense.
"ere is no reason, a priori, that the intellectual property laws could not be subject to an experimentalist 
approach.23 "e laws have general goals and there are many potential ways to achieve them. To take a minor 
example, no one really knows what duration of copyright or patents is optimal. However, there seems at present 
to be very little apparent interest among lawmakers for trying di!erent terms in di!erent jurisdictions or for 
di!erent subject matters and seeing what happens. 
Even though the IP laws are sometimes discussed 
and defended in economic terms, one might say that 
the in#uence of economic thought has been partial. 
"ere is, to be sure, much discussion of incentives as 
the justi$cation for intellectual property, but a full 
application of the scienti$c method has not generally 
been welcome. In fact, proposals by economists to 
tinker with obvious defects in the law are more often 
met with panic than interest.
Rather, despite the e!orts of some scholars, the 
dominant culture of intellectual property  retains a 
persistent linkage with the natural law tradition, which recognizes a natural right in the inventor or creator, 
and the language of property, of which the phrase “intellectual property” is just the most obvious sign.24 In 
this view, the primary duty of the law is to recognize and protect rights of individuals (or corporate individu-
als). "ese could be rights against the government, like the American right against self-incrimination; rights in 
contract; or rights in property. "e recognition of such rights is less a means to some other goal than the point 
of the law itself. What rights should be protected is, moreover, less a matter that depends on circumstance, but 
rather an answer that comes from consideration of fundamental truths.
"e intellectual culture of the rights tradition has created two important di!erences with the competition 
regime in the face of changing conditions and the evolution of the law. 
First, in the face of changing conditions, the logic of a vested right suggested that the priority should be the 
protection the right against erosion. Courts must defend the holder of a vested right not just against external 
threats, but against subsequent government action that might threaten the value of existing rights. Second, rights 
systems generally aspire toward uniformity across jurisdictions. Given a clear idea as to what rights should be 
protected, there is, logically, no clear reason for variation between jurisdictions or nations. 
We can see the practical implications of both of these tendencies as they have manifested over the last few 
decades. For one thing, the reaction to technological change has usually been a forti$cation of the right rather 
than a rethinking of the system.25 Consider, for example, the reaction of the laws to the massive technological 
changes over the 1980s and 1990s, when the successive development of personal computers, digitalization tech-
THE DOMINANT CULTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  RETAINS 
A PERSISTENT LINKAGE WITH 
THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION, 
WHICH RECOGNIZES A NATURAL 
RIGHT IN THE INVENTOR OR 
CREATOR, AND THE LANGUAGE OF 
PROPERTY, OF WHICH THE PHRASE 
“INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY” IS 
JUST THE MOST OBVIOUS SIGN.24
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nologies and the Internet rather obviously changed the assumptions on which both patent and copyright had 
long relied. In both the United States and Europe the predominant legal response was to strengthen copyrights 
and to expand the subject matter of patent. !e merits of such laws are not the subject here; the point was that, 
as opposed to reconsidering what would serve the broader purposes of the law under changed conditions, the 
challenge was framed as protecting the existing rights against potential erosion. 
!e goals of uniformity and predictability has had its clearest implications at the international level. Un-
like competition law, which varies signi"cantly between OECD nations, over the last several decades all of the 
IP laws have become subject to a much stronger and geographically broader web of harmonizing international 
agreements, on multinational, regional and bilateral levels. !e general aim of these treaties is to homogenize 
the world’s IP regimes, reducing or eliminating geographical variation. All of the major laws are the subject of 
longstanding global treaties specifying minimum protections (!e Berne and Paris conventions), which were 
forti"ed in 1994 by the addition of an intellectual property agreement to the World Trade Organization, and 
further strengthened by numerous bilateral treaties since then. And of course the World Trade Organization, 
unlike the informal organizations common to competition law, has the power to punish deviations from the 
intellectual property treaties with serious trade sanctions. 
!e pattern can also be observed at the national level. Both in Europe and the United States the last few 
decades have witnessed many important measures taken to create uniformity. In the United States, a single 
appeals court, the Federal Circuit, has heard the nation’s appeals in patent cases since 1982 in an e#ort to 
bring greater uniformity to the patent law. !ough proposals for constructing a uniform patent court akin to 
the Federal Circuit in the European Union have been unsuccessful so far,26 the European Patent Convention, 
founded in 1973, provides a common application for the prosecution of patents in each of the member states.27
In short, stronger protection of uniform rights has been the clear trajectory of the intellectual property laws 
over the last few decades. !at tendency is sharply at odds with the predispositions of the competition laws.
!e dichotomy I am suggesting here is, of course, not absolute. In certain areas of the competition law, 
one can sense the in$uence of a vested rights theory, in, for example, the resistance to breakups of dominant 
"rms, even if the economic case for doing so might be quite strong. And there are areas in IP law, like the 
American fair use doctrine (a judicial and scholarly favorite), which have, in fact, served as important outlets 
for judicial tinkering in the face of changing conditions. For example the famous Sony decision, blessing the 
VCR, broke with prevalent copyright doctrine, arguably as a reaction to perceived technological necessity.28 
Similarly, following a decade of bad press, Congress, the courts, and the American Patent O%ce have begun to 
make adjustments with American patent law. An example is the new post-grant review process, which includes 
a particular provision targeted at business method patents. 
Nonetheless it would be hard to describe the intellectual culture of either the intellectual property laws as 
truly committed to experimental improvement of the law. It would be even harder to describe competition law 
as devoted to the protection of fundamental rights. We are left with a divergence in intellectual cultures with 
broad implications for just about every advanced economy in the world.
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IV.  USING ANTITRUST FOR  
PATENT EXPERIMENTALISM  
AT THE UNITED STATES  
SUPREME COURT
I believe there is a need for a more experimentalist 
approach to the intellectual property laws, and particu-
larly to the patent laws. !e law, I believe, needs better 
mechanisms not simply to celebrate its successes, but 
to correct its errors, both speci"c and general. One way 
this might be achieved is to act within the structure and 
institutions of the laws themselves; as just discussed, 
this is a project underway in certain respects. But the 
other path is to rely on the competition laws as a kind 
of oversight and adjustment mechanism for the intel-
lectual property laws.
I am, of course, hardly the "rst to advocate this position, and it is clear that the world’s major competi-
tion agencies already view part of their job as handling patents’ unexpected consequences. Yet that role is not 
universally accepted for the ideological reasons just suggested. When a competition agency takes a look at how 
a patent or copyright is actually being used, it raises the question of what degree the government can, having 
given out rights, later declare that it has made a mistake and limit usage based on new evidence.29   !at was 
precisely the question presented in the American Supreme Court’s 2013 patent-antitrust decision, Federal Trade 
Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Court’s "rst case at the intersection of the two laws in quite some time.30   
At issue in the case was a particular practice of brand-name pharmaceutical drug manufacturers and their 
generic rivals with respect to patented drugs. In the late 1990s the Commission began investigating and chal-
lenging certain settlements between patent-holders and would-be generic entrants. !e Commission suspected 
that generics and brand-name manufacturers were settling patent infringement cases in a way that e#ectively 
split patent pro"ts at the expense of the public.
!e facts of the particular case considered by the Supreme Court make clearer how this might happen. 
!e case centered on AndroGel, a testosterone replacement therapy manufactured by Solvay, a relatively large 
drug company. In 2003, two other drug makers sought to introduce generic versions of the drug. While An-
droGel is protected by a patent that expires in 2021, the generics challenged the patent as invalid, and also not 
infringed upon by the proposed generic products. Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, such challenges are a form 
of infringement, and Solvay sued. 
!ree years later the parties settled, agreeing to make generic AndroGel unavailable until 2015. Of course, 
the drug would have reached the public in 2006 or 2007 if the patent had been found invalid or not infringed. 
Meanwhile, Solvay made large payments to the generic manufacturers (which it claimed were unrelated). As 
such, the Federal Trade Commission alleged the settlement was a payment for a delayed arrival of a generic 
drug, or a “pay-for-delay” deal.
NONETHELESS IT WOULD BE HARD 
TO DESCRIBE THE INTELLECTUAL 
CULTURE OF EITHER THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS AS 
TRULY COMMITTED TO EXPERIMENTAL 
IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW. IT WOULD 
BE EVEN HARDER TO DESCRIBE 
COMPETITION LAW AS DEVOTED TO 
THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS. WE ARE LEFT WITH A 
DIVERGENCE IN INTELLECTUAL 
CULTURES WITH BROAD IMPLICATIONS 
FOR JUST ABOUT EVERY ADVANCED 
ECONOMY IN THE WORLD.
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From the view of strict vested rights approach, it is obvious that such settlements ought not to be challenge-
able under the antitrust or other laws, for several reasons. !e patent grant de"nes a right for a private citizen 
that is his with which to do whatever he wants. !e 
idea of government examining, ex poste, the usage of 
rights already granted contradicts the idea of a right 
that has vested. Moreover, even if we might concede 
that the particular usage of the right in question is 
unattractive, the idea of selectively examining such 
rights ex poste threatens the certainty and clarity prized 
by the system as a whole.
!is is what Chief Justice Roberts meant when he 
wrote, in dissent, that a patent right creates a “zone 
within which the patent holder may operate without 
facing antitrust liability.” Once assigned, in this vision 
the right is supreme within the zone de"ned by its 
claims. For the Chief Justice, so long as the patent holder had not left the scope of his assigned right, the case 
was over. As he put it, in a line that captures this notion, there was “no reason adjudicate questions of patent 
law under antitrust principles.”
To the Federal Trade Commission’s lawyers, its Commissioners and a majority of the Supreme Court, at least 
some of these so-called settlements were really just agreements to split the proceeds of a dubious monopoly at 
the consumer’s expense, and as such a speci"c failure of the patent system in need of correction. More broadly, 
since such settlements are not uncommon, they were, as a class, a defect in the system that should be "xed.
!at framing found a receptive audience in Justice Breyer, the majority author, who among American judges 
is one of the most obvious in viewing the intellectual property law as an experiment, and a rather dubious one 
at that. In fact, Breyer’s previous writings represent some of the few pragmatist writings on intellectual prop-
erty to emerge from the Supreme Court. He dissented in Eldred v. Ashcroft, a copyright case that examined a 
legislative e#ort to lengthen the copyright term, retroactively, in light of purportedly changing conditions.31  It 
is hard to see how a retroactive term extension promotes any new authorship, and so Breyer declared that the 
law’s “practical e#ect is not to promote, but to inhibit, the progress of Science.” 
As a professor, Breyer was less restrained. In 1970 he wrote !e Uneasy Case for Copyright, a lengthy piece 
that examined copyright and concluded that the law, if perhaps useful once, was no longer really necessary 
to ensure the production of creative works, and should therefore probably be done away with.32 Both of these 
works reveal a very di#erent approach to legal change than that demanded by a rights-based model. !e law 
is an instrument; we should examine its content in light of its claimed goals and, if current conditions suggest 
the law is valueless, so be it. But until 2013, Breyer had not yet had a chance to write at length on the patent-
antitrust intersection.33  
!e entire opinion is captured by one, early line:  “[R]everse payment settlements can … some times violate 
the antitrust laws.”  !e word “sometimes” is very dear to the competition law and the pragmatist/experimentalist 
method. It suggests uncertainty and a lack of "xed truths, that everything will turn on particularized assessment 
THE ENTIRE OPINION IS CAPTURED BY 
ONE, EARLY LINE:  “$R%EVERSE PAYMENT 
SETTLEMENTS CAN … SOME TIMES 
VIOLATE THE ANTITRUST LAWS.”  THE 
WORD “SOMETIMES” IS VERY DEAR 
TO THE COMPETITION LAW AND 
THE PRAGMATIST/EXPERIMENTALIST 
METHOD. IT SUGGESTS UNCERTAINTY 
AND A LACK OF FIXED TRUTHS, 
THAT EVERYTHING WILL TURN 
ON PARTICULARIZED ASSESSMENT 
OF FACTS AND CONSEQUENCES.
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of facts and consequences. Breyer’s opinion is at pains to emphasize the speci!c contingencies that could create 
anticompetitive consequences, as shown by the following passage with an astonishing string of contingencies 
(seven, by my count) that, in the right combination, may be more important than encouraging settlements. 
[A] reverse payment, where large and unjusti!ed, can bring with it the risk of signi!cant anti-
competitive e"ects; one who makes such a payment may be unable to explain and to justify it; 
such a !rm or individual may well possess market power derived from the patent; a court, by 
examining the size of the payment, may well be able to assess its likely anticompetitive e"ects 
along with its potential justi!cations without litigating the validity of the patent; and parties 
may well !nd ways to settle patent disputes without the use of reverse payments.34
Yet, by far the most signi!cant thing about the opinion is not its use of semi-colons but rather the im-
plication that the antitrust regime sits in a position 
of supreme oversight over the patent laws.35 Breyer’s 
approach makes clear that, potentially, any anticom-
petitive consequence thrown o" by the patent system 
could be subject to challenge. To be sure, a patent gives 
its owner some immunity to antitrust. But “patent and 
antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the 
‘scope of the patent monopoly’—and consequently anti-
trust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.”36 
In the strongest reading of the opinion, patent 
policy is reduced to simply one more factor for antitrust analysis, which is e"ectively made the uber-policy. #at’s 
implied when Breyer says courts should determine liability by “considering traditional antitrust factors such as 
likely anticompetitive e"ects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potential o"setting legal considerations 
present in the circumstances, such as here those related to patents.”37 For adherents to a rights model, it must 
be something to see a property right reduced to merely one of many “potential o"setting legal considerations 
present in the circumstances.”
What we have, ultimately, is a Supreme Court blessing for the use of the competition laws to examine po-
tential excesses of the current patent regime. As such, it represents a powerful victory for a method that uses the 
antitrust laws to improve the functioning of the patent system, not from within the law itself, but by external 
measurement of the law’s consequences for the economy. You may own a patent, it says, but nonetheless, the 
competitions law will always be watching. 
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IN THE STRONGEST READING OF 
THE OPINION, PATENT POLICY 
IS REDUCED TO SIMPLY ONE 
MORE FACTOR FOR ANTITRUST 
ANALYSIS, WHICH IS EFFECTIVELY 
MADE THE UBER$POLICY.…YOU 
MAY OWN A PATENT, IT SAYS, BUT 
NONETHELESS, THE COMPETITIONS 
LAW WILL ALWAYS BE WATCHING. 
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